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This action arises from the Labor Commission’s enforcement of a 
default order entered against Derek Price. Over seven years ago, Marc 
Cummings filed a wage claim against Mad Cow Productions, LLC, his 
employer, with the Utah Labor Commission. Consistent with its practice 
at the time, the Labor Commission identified Mr. Price as a respondent 
in this wage claim proceeding because he was listed as a manager of Mad 
Cow Productions, LLC in papers on file with the Utah Department of 
Commerce. Unbeknownst to Derek Price, the principals of the company 
had identified Mr. Price as the managing member of Mad Cow 
Production, LLC without his knowledge or consent. 
The Labor Commission sent all papers relating to the wage claim 
matter, including the notice of claim, to Mr. Price by first class mail. Mr. 
Price never received this mail, as the addresses on file with the Utah 
Department of Commerce, which were relied upon by the Labor 
Commission, were incorrect. At the time the Labor Commission mailed 
notice to Mr. Price, Mr. Price was living in California. Because Mr. Price 
did not receive notice of this wage claim, he did not respond to it and a 
default was entered against him. 
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After the Labor Commission obtained a default order, it filed a civil 
enforcement action in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County. By 2017, Mr. Price had returned to Utah and obtained 
employment. Thereafter, the Labor Commission started collecting on the 
judgment and a writ of garnishment was served on Mr. Price’s employer. 
Mr. Price learned about the Labor Commission’s judgment against him 
when his employer told him about the writ of garnishment. Mr. Price 
promptly raised defenses to the enforcement of the default order and 
subsequent judgment. He then moved to vacate the judgment.   
The judgment against Mr. Price is unenforceable because Mr. Price 
was not afforded due process. Therefore, the Labor Commission lacked 
jurisdiction to enter the default order. This renders the judgment void 
under Rule 60(b)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.  
Further, the Labor Commission seeks to enforce a judgment that is 
invalid under Heaps v. Nuriche, LLC, 2015 UT 26, 345 P.3d 655. In 
Heaps, the Supreme Court interpreted the Utah Payment of Wages Act 
and held that a managing member of a LLC is not the “employer” under 
the Act and has no personal liability for unpaid wages. Accordingly, 
3 
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Mr. Price is not an “employer” and cannot be held liable for the payment 
of wages.   
This court should affirm the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction 
over Mr. Price’s defenses to the Labor Commission’s enforcement of the 
default order and judgment; affirm the district court’s substantive 
rulings on the issues of service by first class mail and that the judgment 
is invalid under Heaps; and reverse the district court’s denial of his 
request for attorney fees.  
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the district court have jurisdiction over Mr. Price’s 
defenses to the Labor Commission’s civil enforcement of the judgment?   
Mr. Price raised two defenses to the Labor Commission’s 
enforcement of the judgment in his motion to set aside the judgment 
under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.  
Motions to vacate a judgment under Rule 60(b) are ordinarily 
reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Dep’t of Social Services v. Vijil, 
784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989). However, when the claim or defense is 
based on a lack of jurisdiction, no discretion is given to the trial court. Id. 
(“[I]f jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment cannot stand without denying 
4 
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due process to the one against whom it runs.”). A jurisdictional 
determination is a question of law, subject to a correction-of-error 
standard. Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d 768, 771 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). The district court is given no deference. Vijil, 784 P.2d at 1134. 
This issue was raised by Mr. Price in his reply memorandum in 
support of Defendant Derek Price’s Motion to Set Aside Judgment 
Against Him; For Order re: Return of Garnished Funds; and For 
Sanctions (“Motion to Vacate”). R. 240-244.   
2. Did the district court err by ruling that the res judicata 
doctrine did not bar Mr. Price from challenging the Judgment? 
The application of the res judicata doctrine is a question of law. 
Marcris & Assocs. v. Neways, 2000 UT 93, ¶ 17, 16 P.3d 1214. The district 
court is given no deference, and its ruling is reviewed for correctness. Id.   
This issue was preserved for review in Mr. Price’s reply 
memorandum in support of the Motion to Vacate. R. 248-250.   
3. Did the district court err by holding that first class mail was 
insufficient to afford Mr. Price with due process of law?   
“Due process challenges are questions of law . . . [subject to] a 
correction of error standard.” West Valley City v. Roberts, 1999 UT App 
5 
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358, ¶ 6, 993 P.2d 252 (citing Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 
P.2d 23, 28 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). This issue was preserved for review in 
Mr. Price’s Motion to Vacate and reply memorandum. R. 88-91, 244-247.  
4. Did the district court err by holding that Heaps v. Nuriche 
applies retroactively? 
Assuming Mr. Price was a manager per the Labor Commission’s 
decision,1 the district court’s ruling that Heaps applies retroactively, a 
question of statutory interpretation, was a conclusion of law. Monarrez v. 
Utah Dept. of Trans., 2016 UT 10, ¶ 7, 368 P.3d 846. As a conclusion of 
law, the trial court is given no deference and its ruling is subject to a 
correction of error standard. Id. 
This issue was preserved for review in Mr. Price’s reply to the 
Motion to Vacate. R. 250-251.  
5. Did the district court err by not awarding Mr. Price attorney 
fees? 
                                           
1 Mr. Price disputes that he was ever the managing member of Mad Cow 
Productions, LLC or Level 11 Mentoring, LLC, but even assuming he 
was, he cannot be held liable under the Utah Payment of Wages Act 
under Heaps v. Nuriche, LLC, 2015 UT 26, 345 P.3d 655. 
6 
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Under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825, the court can award attorney 
fees if the prevailing party asserts that the opposing party’s claim or 
defense is meritless and brought in bad faith. Childs v. Callahan, 1999 
UT App 359, ¶ 16, 993 P.2d 244. “Whether a claim is meritorious is a 
question of law that [the appellate court] review[s] for correctness.” 
Bresee v. Barton, 2016 UT App 220, ¶ 48, 387 P.3d 536 (citing Jeschke v. 
Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 203 (Utah Ct. App 1991)). “A finding of bad faith is 
a question of fact and is reviewed [on appeal] under the ‘clearly erroneous 
standard.’” Bresee, 2016 UT App 220, ¶ 54 (citing Jeschke, 811 P.2d at 
204).  
This issue was preserved for review. R. 93, 251-252; see also 
Docketing Statement, filed October 5, 2017. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Labor Commission Obtains Judgment Against Mr. Price 
1. Marc Cummings filed a claim for unpaid wages on May 25, 
2010 against Mad Cow Productions, LLC with the Utah Labor 
Commission, commencing Wage Claim No. 10-02240.  R. 96, 198.  
2. The Labor Commission identified Mr. Price as a respondent. 
See, e.g., R. 96. 
7 
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3. The Labor Commission claims it mailed to Mr. Price a notice 
of Wage Claim No. 10-02240 and a document titled Preliminary Finding 
in Wage Claim No. 10-02240 to the following addresses:  
553 E 1050 N 
Orem UT 84057 
 
3068 S 1000 E 
Salt Lake City UT 84106 
R. 182, 198, 200-201. The foregoing addresses shall be referred to 
hereafter as the “Addresses.”  
4. Mr. Price has not lived at 553 East 1050 North, Orem, Utah 
84057 since the early 1990s. R. 102.   
5. Mr. Price has never lived at 3068 South 1000 East, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84106, and he does not recognize this address. R. 102. 
6. There is no evidence that the Labor Commission did any due 
diligence or minimal research to try and learn whether the Addresses on 
file with the Utah Department of Commerce were correct addresses for 
Mr. Price.   
7. In any event, Mr. Price did not receive the papers that the 
Labor Commission sent him at the foregoing Addresses. Mr. Price had 
previously quit working for Mad Cow when his paychecks bounced in 
8 
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September 2010 and he lost confidence in Mad Cow’s ability to continue 
to pay him for the work he was doing. R. 101. At the time he was living 
at 21272 Forest Meadow, Lake Forest, California 92630. R. 101. And, 
prior to moving to California, Mr. Price was living at 1756 E. Portal Way, 
Sandy, Utah 84093. R. 101. 
8. On January 27, 2011, the Utah Labor Commission entered an 
Order on Default and Order to Pay (the “Default Order”) in Wage Claim 
No. 10-02240, in favor of Mr. Cummings and against Level 11 Mentoring, 
LLC, Aaron Christner, Mad Cow Productions, LLC (“Mad Cow”), Ryan 
Jensen, and Derek Price (the “Defendants”).  R. 96-98, 203-206. 
9. The Certificate of Mailing attached to the Default Order 
shows that a copy of the Order to Pay was mailed to Mr. Price at the 
Addresses. R. 98, 206. Mr. Price did not receive the Default Order because 
he did not live at the Addresses.   
10. On June 6, 2012, the Utah Labor Commission commenced this 
action in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, by filing an Abstract of Final Award (the “Judgment”) against the 
Defendants. The Judgment is in the amount of $12,590.03, plus interest 
and costs incurred in enforcing the judgment. R. 1-2. 
9 
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11. The Judgment identifies two addresses for Mr. Price, which 
are the same Addresses listed in the Certificate of Mailing attached to 
the Order to Pay. R. 1-2.2 
12. There is nothing on file with the district court showing that 
the Judgment was ever mailed to Mr. Price or served on him (or any of 
the other Defendants).3  
The Labor Commission’s Garnishment of Funds  
13. On January 5, 2017, an administrative writ of garnishment 
was issued, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63A-3-507.  R. 111-113.4  The 
writ was subsequently served on Mr. Price’s employer, garnishee 
MasterControl, Inc. (“MasterControl”).    
                                           
2 The Judgment Information Statement that was filed together with the 
Abstract of Final Award or Judgment, on June 6, 2012, states that the 
last known address of Derek Price is 1487 Arthur Drive, Provo, Utah 
84601. In any event, Mr. Price was living in California at this time. R. 
101. Further, there is no evidence or proof of service on file with the 
district court that the Judgment was ever mailed to Mr. Price at this 
Provo address or any other address. 
3 See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-303 (requiring that the clerk of the district 
court record the date that notice of the action is mailed to the judgment 
debtor).  
4 The writ of garnishment, titled “Administrative Garnishment Order” in 
the pleading caption, misidentifies Derek Price.  It identifies him as 




14. Mr. Price was informed by a co-worker at MasterControl that 
MasterControl had been served with the writ of garnishment pertaining 
to a judgment that had been entered against him. R. 101.   
15. Thereafter, and for the first time, Mr. Price learned that, 
according to the Utah Department of Commerce, he is identified as the 
registered agent and manager for Mad Cow. R. 102; see R. 186-188. 
Mr. Price was unaware of this until MasterControl informed him of the 
writ of garnishment. R. 102. Aaron Christner and Ryan Jensen, the 
owners of Mad Cow, never told Mr. Price that they had listed him as the 
manager and/or registered agent for Mad Cow. R. 102.  
16. On February 9, 2017, Mr. Price filed a Reply and Request for 
Hearing and challenged the writ of garnishment. R. 54-57. Mr. Price 
stated, among other things, that Aaron Christner and Ryan Jensen 
fraudulently used his personal information to put the Mad Cow business 
under his name: 
I was an employee of Mad Cow. After several of my paychecks 
bounced I quit. The owners (Aaron Christner + Ryan Jensen) 
used my ID provided for employment to put their business 
under my name. They even got my address and middle initial 




17. Mr. Price was named as a defendant in Wage Claim No. 10-
02240 because someone else (presumably Aaron Christner or Ryan 
Jensen) had listed him as a manager of Mad Cow.5 R. 106, 181.  
18. As explained by Heather Gunnarson, prior to the Heaps 
decision in 2015, the Director of the Utah Anti-Discrimination and Labor 
Division as of June 2011, the Labor Commission had a practice of listing 
officers of a company as defendants in a case for unpaid wages: 
When we process wage claims under the Act, we always refer 
to the Utah Department of Commerce records to identify the 
officers of the respondent business entity and name them as 
parties in our actions because of our understanding and 
interpretation of the code.   
R. 115-116. 
 
                                           
5 Aaron Christner and Ryan Jensen appear to have a history of scamming 
consumers and employees. In a Media Alert announcement by the Utah 
Department of Commerce, dated September 18, 2014, a notification was 
issued that Aaron Christner and Ryan Jensen were fined for numerous 
violations of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act and the Telephone 
Fraud Prevention Act. Judgment had been entered against them, in the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, for $425,993, and they 
were permanently barred from selling assisted marketing plans or 
operating a telemarketing business.  R. 108-109. 
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The District Court Gave the Labor Commission the Opportunity to 
Correct the Issue of Mr. Price Being Improperly Named as a 
Defendant with the Labor Commission 
19. At the hearing held before the district court on February 17, 
2017 on Mr. Price’s request for a hearing on the writ of garnishment 
issued to MasterControl, the Court stayed the writ of garnishment for 30 
days to give Mr. Price the opportunity to attempt to correct the issue with 
the Labor Commission. R. 62 (“THE COURT WILL NOT ENFORCE 
GARNISHMENT FOR 30 DAYS TO ALLOW DEFENDANT TO SEEK CORRECTION TO 
ISSUE.”). 
20. The district court requested that the Labor Commission notify 
the court of any status change within the stay-period. R. 62. 
21. Thereafter, Mr. Price promptly contacted the Labor 
Commission and requested that it withdraw his name from the 
Judgment. R. 101. Specifically, on or about March 6, 2017, Mr. Price sent 
several papers via certified mail to the Labor Commission, with a letter 
explaining that he was never a manager at Mad Cow and was similarly 
not paid wages. R. 145-146, 241.  
22. After receiving no response, Mr. Price made several phone 
calls to the Labor Commission and tried to get in touch with someone 
13 
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that knew something about his case. R. 146, 242. When no one responded 
to his phone calls, Mr. Price went to visit the Labor Commission in 
person. At that visit, Mr. Price was told that he needed to get in touch 
with Eric Larsen, the Wage Claim Unit Manager. R. 146, 242.   
23. Mr. Price emailed Mr. Larsen on March 28, 2017 and, again, 
explained that the correct business owner was not him; it was Aaron 
Christner. R. 146, 151-152. Mr. Larsen responded the next day and asked 
for the wage claim number. R. 146, 151. Mr. Price emailed Mr. Larsen 
again on March 29, 2017, provided the wage claim number, and gave the 
same explanation given in his letter and papers that were previously 
mailed to the Labor Commission. R. 146, 150-151.  
24. After receiving no substantive response from Mr. Larsen, Mr. 
Price went to the Labor Commission again, on March 31, 2017, to request 
a meeting with Mr. Larsen. R. 146. Mr. Larsen, after first stating that 
Mr. Price had “ruined his day,” told Mr. Price that notice and time to 
respond had passed. R. 146. As explained by Mr. Price: 
On March 31st, I went to the Labor Commission’s office and 
asked to speak with Eric Larsen. Mr. Larsen came out of his 
office and spoke to me in the lobby area. I reiterated that I 
was never an owner of Mad Cow and that it was extremely 
stressful for me to have my paychecks garnished. Mr. Larsen 
said that I had “ruined his day” because he had to miss 
14 
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meetings and that he had no “update” to give me. Mr. Larsen 
told me that “this is an old case” and that he didn’t have time 
to “waste” to get the issue fixed. He told me to leave the office 
and that he would have an update early next week. 
R. 147.  
25. After this discussion in person, Mr. Larsen sent an email 
stating that “[p]roper notice of this claim, and its process, was sent to 
numerous addresses of all principles of business, including yourself . . . . 
Numerous opportunities were given to appeal or dispute the claim . . . .” 
R. 104, 147. The email further stated that “no amendments will be made 
by our office, nor the Office of State Debt Collection regarding collection 
procedures of this claim.” R. 104, 147. 
26. In an email exchange between Eric Larsen and Assistant 
Attorney General Jacob H.B. Franklin on April 3, 2017, Mr. Franklin told 
Mr. Larsen “You have [the Office of State Debt Collection’s (“OSDC”)] 
blessing to go ahead and tell them that no changes will be made—except 
that OSDC might be willing to enter into a Voluntary Wage Assignment 
15 
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. . . for a reduced monthly amount (but not a reduced total balance 
amount).” R. 156.6 
27. Up until April 6, 2017, Mr. Price had represented himself pro 
se, but beginning on April 6, 2017, Mr. Price was represented by above-
captioned counsel at Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough, PC. R. 79-81.   
28. Mr. Price filed his Motion to Vacate the Judgment on April 14, 
2017. R. 84-127. 
29. Shortly after Mr. Price filed his Motion to Vacate, the Labor 
Commission appears to have made its best attempt to get a quick ruling 
from the district court that the writ of garnishment could be enforced. 
Rather than file a motion, giving Mr. Price the opportunity to respond, 
the Labor Commission filed on April 19, 2017 a proposed Order Re 
Garnishment and in this order, the Labor Commission had included 
“findings” of the district court (with no supporting evidence), which 
stated, among other things, that: “Derek Price’s objection [to the writ of 
garnishment] dealt with the merits of the underlying claim and 
administrative order issued against him by the Labor Commission”; 
                                           
6 Mr. Price’s counsel asked the Labor Commission for a copy of the file for 
Wage Claim No. 10-02240, and this email exchange was contained in the 
documents provided to Mr. Price’s counsel. See R. 156. 
16 
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“[t]he underlying administrative order issued by the Labor Commission 
is not properly before this Court for review at this time” and “[a]s such, 
this Court cannot address Defendant Derek Price’s objections”; and 
finally, “[t]he status of the underlying order in this matter has not 
changed, and the 30-day stay period has not passed.” R. 132-135.7   
30. The Labor Commission filed its memorandum in opposition to 
the Motion to Vacate on April 28, 2017. R. 165-179.  
31. Mr. Price filed his reply memorandum in further support of 
the Motion to Vacate on May 10, 2017. R. 238-253. 
                                           
7 Mr. Price quickly responded to the Labor Commission’s proposed Order 
Re Garnishment by objecting to it on April 20, 2017. R. 138-156. In that 
objection, Mr. Price made the same arguments that he had made in his 
Motion to Vacate. R. 138-156. The Labor Commission then filed a motion 
to strike Mr. Price’s objection for being untimely. R. 159-162. Mr. Price 
felt that in order to ensure that he did not waive his position that the 
Labor Commission is not entitled to enforce the Judgment, Mr. Price 
opposed the Labor Commission’s motion to strike. R. 220-223. The Labor 
Commission filed a reply to the motion to strike. R. 230-235. Ultimately, 
the district court signed the Order Re Garnishment on May 17, 2017, 
after Mr. Price’s Motion to Vacate had been fully briefed but before the 
Motion had been decided. R. 283-286. The Order Re Garnishment 
permitted the Labor Commission to proceed to enforce the writ of 
garnishment. R. 283-286. There was no comment by the district court in 
the Order Re Garnishment as to the merits of the Labor Commission’s 
motion to strike or the arguments made by Mr. Price in his objection to 
the proposed Order Re Garnishment.  
17 
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32. A hearing was held on Mr. Price’s Motion to Vacate on June 
19, 2017. R. 291-294. While the district court took the matter under 
advisement, the district court ordered a stay on any further collection of 
the Judgment. The district court ordered the Labor Commission to hold 
in its possession any funds that had been garnished until further order 
of the court. R. 293.  
33. The district court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order 
on August 2, 2017. R. 295-308. The district court ruled that (1) service by 
first class mail was insufficient to afford Mr. Price due process, R. 301; 
(2) res judicata does not apply, R. 303; and (3) Heaps applies 
retroactively, rendering the Judgment invalid, R. 303. 
34. Although the district court ruled in Mr. Price’s favor on the 
merits, the district court did not order the Judgment vacated. Rather, the 
district court quashed the writ of garnishment and ordered Mr. Price to 
file a motion to set aside in the administrative proceeding, and to give 
Marc Cummings notice. R. 304 (“The Court is concerned that setting 
aside the abstract at this point would require notice to the wage 
claimant.”); R. 306 (“Accordingly, the Court orders that the writ of 
18 
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garnishment be quashed and that Mr. Price pursue a motion to set aside 
in the administrative proceeding with notice to all interested parties.”).8  
35. Mr. Price’s request for attorney fees was denied. R. 305. 
36. Mr. Price has not received a return of the funds that the Labor 
Commission already garnished from his employer, MasterControl. 
  
                                           
8 Mr. Price followed the district court’s order and filed a motion to set 
aside before the Labor Commission. Claimant Marc Cummings was 
notified (a copy was sent via certified mail) and he did not respond to the 




SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Court should affirm the district court’s Memorandum Decision 
and Order, holding that the Judgment cannot be enforced and quashing 
the writ of garnishment. The Labor Commission did not have jurisdiction 
over Derek Price when the underlying Default Order was entered. 
Service by first class mail, even in an administrative action, does not 
afford a respondent with sufficient due process. 
Further, the Judgment cannot be enforced against Mr. Price 
because he is not liable for unpaid wages, under the Utah Payment of 
Wages Act, because he is not an “employer.” Heaps v. Nuriche, LLC, 2015 
UT 26, 345 P.3d 665. It is well-settled that interpretation of a statute 
applies retroactively because there has been no change in the law. 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Utah Payment of 
Wages Act in Heaps is retroactive and invalidates the Judgment against 
Mr. Price.   
The district court correctly decided these two issues and the court’s 
exercise of jurisdiction was correct under the plain language of the Utah 
Administrative Procedure Act (“UAPA”). This Court should affirm the 
district court on these issues.  
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The res judicata doctrine is inapplicable here. Res judicata bars a 
claim that was already litigated in a prior action. Here, there is no new 
claim being asserted. Mr. Price asserts defenses now that he has 
otherwise been unable to raise previously, because he lacked notice. 
Moreover, the Labor Commission’s claim that Mr. Price is liable for Mr. 
Cummings’ unpaid wages was never adjudicated on the merits. Res 
judicata does not apply.  
Finally, attorney fees should be awarded because the Labor 
Commission’s arguments to the district court lacked merit and were 
made in bad faith. The Labor Commission’s position that it is too late to 
challenge the Default Order and Judgment, even though the Commission 
does not dispute that Mr. Price never received notice of the underlying 
wage claim, and even though the Judgment is clearly contrary to Heaps, 
demonstrates the Labor Commission’s bad faith. Given that the Labor 
Commission did not appear to do any due diligence to find correct 
addresses for Mr. Price (prior to the entry of the Default Order); the Labor 
Commission’s refusal to provide any meaningful response to Mr. Price 
once the district court gave him the opportunity to try and correct the 
issue (during the 30-day stay); the Commission’s filing of the proposed 
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Order Re Garnishment after Mr. Price had filed his Motion to Vacate; 
and most importantly, the Labor Commission’s attempts to enforce a 
Judgment that is clearly erroneous, invalid, and contrary to Supreme 
Court precedent in Heaps, are sufficient grounds to conclude that the 
Labor Commission has acted in bad faith.  Accordingly, Mr. Price should 






I. THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER 
DEREK PRICE’S DEFENSES TO THE LABOR 
COMMISSION’S ENFORCEMENT OF THE JUDGMENT. 
 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”) provides the 
district court jurisdiction to hear Mr. Price’s defenses to the enforcement 
of the Judgment. 
In order to seek judicial review under Part 4 of the UAPA, Section 
63G-4-401, a challenger to an agency’s decision must first exhaust all 
administrative remedies, see Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-301.  However, Mr. 
Price did not seek judicial review of an agency decision under Part 4 of 
the UAPA  
Instead, Mr. Price challenged the Labor Commission’s civil 
enforcement of its Default Order and subsequent Judgment under Part 
5 of UAPA, Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-501. Part 5 of the UAPA confers 
jurisdiction on a district court when an agency seeks to enforce an order 
in Utah district court. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-501. Consistent with this 
chapter of the UAPA, Mr. Price challenged the Labor Commission’s 
enforcement action on the ground that its Default Order  was obtained 
without due process and the Default Order against him is invalid because 
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it runs against the clear holding of Heaps that managers are not 
personally liable for unpaid wage claims. Thus, Part 4 of the UAPA does 
not apply and Mr. Price was not required to exhaust administrative 
remedies. However, as explained below, even if Part 4 of the UAPA 
applied, the district court would still have possessed jurisdiction because 
exhaustion of administrative remedies is futile in this case. 
A. The District Court’s Exercise of Jurisdiction was Proper under 
Part 5 of the UAPA, Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-501. 
Under Part 5 of the UAPA, Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-501(3), district 
courts have jurisdiction to hear a defendant’s defenses to a state agency’s 
enforcement of an administrative order: 
(3) In a proceeding for civil enforcement of an agency’s order, 
in addition to any other defenses allowed by law, a defendant 
may defend on the ground that: 
(a) the order sought to be enforced was issued by an agency 
without jurisdiction to issue the order; 
(b) the order does not apply to the defendant; . . . . 
This section of the UAPA applies here because the district court 
proceeding below was a “proceeding for civil enforcement” of the Labor 
Commission’s Default Order and Mr. Price defended against such 
enforcement on the grounds available to him under subsections 3(a) and 
3(b). Namely, as explained more fully below, that (1) the Labor 
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Commission did not have jurisdiction for lack of due process, rendering 
the Default Order void under Rule 60(b)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure (an argument that falls squarely within subsection (3)(a)) and 
(2) the Default Order is invalid and unenforceable as applied to him 
under Heaps v. Nuriche, LLC, 2015 UT 26, 345 P.3d 665, because Mr. 
Price is not an “employer” subject to liability under the Utah Payment of 
Wages Act (an argument that falls squarely within subsection 3(b)). 
Under the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-501, the district 
court had jurisdiction to hear these defenses to the Labor Commission’s 
civil enforcement of its final decision against Mr. Price. Moreover, the 
UAPA’s grant of jurisdiction to district court’s is broad—district court 
may consider “any other defenses allowed by law.” Utah Code Ann. § 63G-
4-501(3). 
The statutory grant of judicial review under Utah Code Ann. § 63G-
4-501 does not require a defendant in a civil enforcement action to 
exhaust administrative remedies, i.e., by first appealing to the Labor 
Commission Appeals Board under Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-9, before 
petitioning for judicial review. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403 (a 
petition for judicial review is filed with the Utah Court of Appeals). The 
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requirement to exhaust all administrative remedies only applies to 
judicial review provided in Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-401, a section of the 
UAPA that does not apply in this case.  
Accordingly, because the Labor Commission sought to enforce the 
Default Order in civil enforcement proceeding in district court, 
exhaustion of administrative remedies was not required and Mr. Price 
was entitled to defend the Default Order and resulting Judgment in 
district court by raising “any other defenses allowed by law.” Utah Code 
Ann. § 63G-4-501(3).  
B. In the Alternative, the District Court Had  Jurisdiction Under 
Part 4 of the UAPA, Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-401(2)(b). 
Even if the Labor Commission’s civil enforcement proceeding in the 
district court below was governed by Part 4 of the UAPA (which it was 
not), the district court would still have had jurisdiction to adjudicate Mr. 
Price’s objections to the Judgment because exhaustion of administrative 
remedies is futile in this case.  Part 4 of the UAPA provides: 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all 
administrative remedies available, except that: 
… 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the 
requirement to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if:  
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(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm 
disproportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring 
exhaustion. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-401(2)(b).  Accordingly, even if this section of 
the UAPA applies, it was proper for the district court to adjudicate Mr. 
Price’s defenses to the Judgment because Mr. Price’s administrative 
remedies are inadequate and there is no public benefit in allowing the 
Labor Commission to enforce judgments the Labor Commission obtained 
based on its erroneous understanding of the Utah Payment of Wages Act. 
First, the Labor Commission’s conduct demonstrates that 
administrative remedies are inadequate for Mr. Price. The Labor 
Commission was already given the opportunity to consider Mr. Price’s 
objection its Default Order, and it took the position that such arguments 
were a “waste” of time. The Labor Commission has consistently taken the 
position that Mr. Price was properly served and that it is too late to 
address the underlying merits of Mr. Price’s defenses. R. 104, 147, 156. 
Thus, any argument that Mr. Price exhaust administrative remedies is 
futile.  
Second, there is no public benefit derived from requiring Mr. Price 
to exhaust his administrative remedies. The public has an interest in the 
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Labor Commission, a state agency, adjudicating wage claims in a fair 
manner. Further, the public has an interest in the Labor Commission 
following the law. Enforcing an invalid judgment against Mr. Price (and 
enforcing presumably dozens, if not hundreds, of invalid judgments 
against other individuals) that runs afoul of Heaps is not in the public’s 
interest.  
The public derives no benefit from exhaustion in this case. To the 
contrary, the public derives an immediate benefit from an order that 
stops the Labor Commission from enforcing a Judgment that it obtained 
pre-Heaps based on its erroneous reading of the Utah Payment of Wages 
Act and attempted to enforce post-Heaps knowing that the Judgment is 
contrary to Utah law. Indeed, because it was the Labor Commission’s 
regular practice to name non-employer managers as respondents in wage 
claims prior to the Heaps decision (R 115-116), a decision in this case has 
potentially a sweeping public benefit, particularly to those like Mr. Price 
who the Labor Commission were erroneously charged with wage debt 
prior to the Heaps decision. Accordingly, because there is no public 
benefit derived from exhaustion of administrative remedies in this case, 
and requiring exhaustion would harm Mr. Price (by permitting the Labor 
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Commission to deprive him of his property pending exhaustion), the 
UAPA excuses any requirement that Mr. Price exhaust administrative 
remedies.   
Thus, in the event that the Court finds that jurisdiction is not 
conferred by Part 5 of the UAPA, Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-501, the Court 
should rule, alternatively, that Part 4 of the UAPA conferred the district 
court with jurisdiction under the exhaustion exception in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63G-4-401(2)(b).   
II. THE JUDGMENT IS VOID UNDER RULE 60(4)(B) 
BECAUSE FIRST CLASS MAIL IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
AFFORD DUE PROCESS. 
Under Rule 60(4)(b)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a 
litigant can seek relief from a judgment or order when the judgment is 
void for lack of due process. See, e.g., State v. Speed, 2017 UT App 76, 
¶ 19, 397 P.3d 824 (“A successful rule 60(b)(4) request for relief provides 
relief from judgments entered without constitutionally required due 
process as well as those entered without jurisdiction.”). In C504750P LLC 
v. Baker, 2017 UT App 36, 397 P.3d 599, this Court explained that “[i]f a 
‘judgment [is] entered without the notice required by due process,’ it is 
void and rule 60(b)(4) provides a basis for relief.’”  Id. ¶ 9. The reason for 
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this is because the “district court lacks personal jurisdiction when there 
has not been effective service of process . . . .” Cooper v. Dressel, 2016 UT 
App 246, ¶ 3, 391 P.3d 338. “And judgments entered by a district court 
lacking personal jurisdiction over the defendant are void.”  Id.  
“Consequently, a judgment entered against [a] party that was never 
properly served is void.”  Id.  
As explained above, the Labor Commission served Mr. Price by first 
class mail and all of the papers related to the wage claim were sent to the 
wrong address. The Labor Commission does not dispute this, nor do they 
dispute that Mr. Price never received the Labor Commission’s notice of 
wage claim, proposed Preliminary Finding, and Default Order. Rather, 
the Labor Commission stands by its rules of procedure and argues that 
there was no offense to due process here.  
The Labor Commission’s rules of procedure provide that the 
Commission may serve a respondent by first class mail. Specifically, 
pursuant to R610-3-4.F, once a wage claim is filed, the Labor Commission 
shall “mail to the Defendant a copy of the claim and a blank answer form 
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together with an accompany agency cover letter.” R. 119.9 “Mail” means 
first class mail. R610-3-2.I.; R. 118; see App. Br. at 12.10  
The Labor Commission rule permitting service by first class mail is 
unconstitutional. First class mail is insufficient to afford due process over 
a wage claim respondent such as Derek Price. 
The United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution require 
due process of law before a State can deprive a person of life, liberty or 
property. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”); 
UTAH CONST. art. I, § 7 (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
                                           
9 “The Defendant shall have ten working days from the date of the letter 
to submit an answer to the claim.” R. 119 (R610-3-4.G). If a defendant 
does not file an answer the Division may “[a]ttempt to obtain from the 
Defendant an answer and statement.” R. 119 (R610-3-5.B). When no 
response is filed with the Labor Commission, a default order may be 
entered. R. 120 (R610-3-7) (stating when a hearing officer may issue an 
Order on Default and Order to Pay).   
10 In its brief, the Labor Commission states that the district court held 
that certified mail is required “even though the legislature did not see 
fit to do so. App. Brief at 12 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Commission 
states in its brief, without citing any authority, that the “UAPA requires 
only that notice be mailed.” App. Brief at 13 (emphasis added). But the 
rule authorizing service by first class mail was not a decision by the 
legislature; it was a rule promulgated by the Labor Commission itself.  
Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-9 grants the Labor Commission authority to 
“make rules consistent with this chapter governing wage claims and 
payment of wages.”  
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property, without due process of law.”). The minimum requirements of 
due process require “[t]imely and adequate notice and an opportunity to 
be heard in a meaningful way . . . .” In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 876 
(Utah 1996). Due process “prevents the state from extinguishing a 
citizen’s property rights without notice and an opportunity to be heard.” 
Jordan v. Jensen, 2017 UT 1, ¶ 20, 391 P.3d 183. 
In the United States Supreme Court’s seminal case on proper 
notice, the Court declared that constitutionally adequate notice depends 
on “all the circumstances” and “peculiarities of the case.” Mullane v. 
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). A particular 
method of service is of course subject to challenge by the courts. Personal 
service is not always required and courts, when deciding whether the 
method service is adequate, must balance the interests of the agency and 
affected individual.   
The Utah Supreme Court explained, in Anderson v. Public Service 
Com’n of Utah, 839 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992), that:   
To determine whether the agency has acted reasonably in 
choosing a method of notice, we balance the interest sought to 
be protected against the interest of the agency.  Tulsa 
Professional Collection Servs. Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 484, 
108 S. Ct. 1340, 1344, 99 L. Ed. 2d 565 (1988); Carlson v. Bos, 
740 P.2d 1269, 1273-74 (Utah 1987).  In undertaking this 
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analysis, we focus on whether the method of service strikes a 
reasonable balance between the interests of the agency 
and the affected individual, see Tulsa, 485 U.S. at 484, 108 
S. Ct. at 1344, while keeping in mind that the state’s burden 
is less onerous in administrative proceedings.   
 
Id. at 825 (emphasis added).  After evaluating the competing interests of 
the Public Service Commission and the plaintiff, the Court in Anderson 
held that the Motor Carrier Act, requiring service by certified mail, was 
sufficient to afford due process.  Id. at 825-26.  
The Court explained that certified mail “does not place an undue 
burden on the [state administrative agency].” Id. at 825. “[C]ertified mail 
is far less costly and less personnel-intensive [than personal service] . . . 
it is a reliable method of notice.” Id. Because Anderson’s interest was 
significant and the administrative burden of certified mail was not 
significant, the Court held that the balancing of interests required the 
Commission to provide notice via certified mail. Id. at 823, 825.  
The Labor Commission cites to a recent case, John Kuhni & Sons 
Inc. v. Labor Commission, 2018 UT App 6, 414 P.3d 952. App. Brief at 13. 
At issue in this was the notice requirement in the Utah Occupational 
Safety and Health Act, see Utah Code Ann. § 34A-6-303(1), which 
provided that notice should be sent via “certified mail.” Notice of a 
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citation issued to John Kuhni & Sons was sent by the Utah Occupational 
Safety and Health Division of the Labor Commission via FedEx. 2018 UT 
App 6, ¶ 3.  Kuhni argued that the notice was invalid because it was sent 
by FedEx and, according to Kuhni, the statute required that the certified 
mail be sent by the United States Postal Service. Id. ¶¶ 6-8. This Court 
agreed with Kuhni and held that the Labor Commission Appeals Board 
had incorrectly determined that Kuhni was property served.  Id. ¶¶ 9-22. 
Kuhni does not support the Labor Commission’s position, nor does 
the Anderson case. While neither of these cases address service by first 
class mail, they at least lend support for Mr. Price’s position that service 
by certified mail would have been a more reliable way to notify him than 
first class mail.   
The Labor Commission cites no case supporting its position that 
first class mail affords due process. It argues that it is “not aware of any 
Utah appellate decision that requires agencies to use certified mail when 
the applicable statute requires only service by mail.” App. Brief at 14.11 
                                           
11 There is no “statute” permitting service by first class mail. Rather, it is 
the Labor Commission’s own rules that allow for service by first class 
mail, which Mr. Price challenges. 
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But this argument doesn’t address whether first class mail affords an 
individual due process. 
While the Labor Commission has an interest in minimizing its 
administrative burden and performing its role efficiently, its efforts to 
properly notify respondents in a wage claim, including Mr. Price, falls 
well below any reasonable standard. There is no evidence that the Labor 
Commission did anything to try and find a current address for Mr. Price 
before mailing the notice of wage claim or after no response was received. 
In fact, the Labor Commission’s rules support not performing any due 
diligence; R610-3-2.I. provides that “mail” means first class mail sent to 
“the last known address on the Commission’s record.” R. 118.    
The Labor Commission defends its position, arguing that “none of 
the Commission’s notices mailed to Mr. Price were returned as 
undeliverable.” App. Brief at 14. But the fact that the mail was not 
returned does not in any way suggest that the Mr. Price received the 
mail. Moreover, the Labor Commission’s reasoning in its brief is telling: 
“If the addresses on file for Mr. Price were erroneous, the notices would 
not have reached him whether mailed first class or certified.” App. Brief 
at 14. But that is the point: If the Labor Commission had sent him notice 
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by certified mail, it would have been alerted to the fact that the Addresses 
were wrong and prompted it to look into his Mr. Price’s actual 
whereabouts.  
In balancing the interests of the Labor Commission and the affected 
individual, see Anderson, 839 P.2d at 825, the Court should rule that 
serving an individual by first class mail is insufficient to afford an 
individual with due process. The district court’s ruling that the Labor 
Commission should amend its rules and serve individuals via certified 
mail is sound. As stated by the district court: 
The burden on the Commission to alter its service 
requirement to certified mail would be minimal for its 
outgoing mail. Certified mail would have avoided the 
situation where Mr. Price was blindsided with the judgment 
against him. Simply sending notices by certified mail would 
be almost as effective at reaching the correct person than 
personally serving the parties but without the burden and 
expense of paying a process server. The Court notes that 
certified mail would meet the notice burden under Rule 4 for 
service of a civil complaint, and the burden is “less onerous in 
administrative proceedings.” Anderson, 839 P.2d at 825. 
R. 301.12  
                                           
12 The district court commented that this case is “a reminder that the 
Department of Commerce’s business directory is open to fraud when 
people can register a business in the name of another without their 
knowledge or consent.” R. 301. In its brief, the Labor Commission focuses 
on the district court’s statement that “‘[n]either party has presented 
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III. THE JUDGMENT IS INVALID AND UNENFORCEABLE 
UNDER HEAPS. 
The Utah Payment of Wages Act provides that an “employer” is 
responsible for the payment of wages. Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-5(1)(a). In 
Heaps, a case decided in 2015, the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the 
definition of “employer” and expressly held that managers of an employer 
cannot be held personally liable for unpaid wages, because they are not 
the “employer.” 2015 UT 26, ¶ 16. The Court’s decision rested upon the 
longstanding principle that a business officer or manager can only be 
exposed to personal liability in limited contexts. Id. Absent express 
language in the statute, the Heaps Court held that the legislature did not 
intend to impose personal liability against a managing member “in 
contravention of long-standing principles of corporate law.” Id.   
                                           
evidence of whether this sort of situation has occurred in the past and 
how often’”, App. Brief at 14 (citing R. 301), suggesting that the lack of 
evidence on this point weakens Mr. Price’s argument. Yet from Mr. 
Price’s perspective, this is not the pinnacle reason why first class mail is 
insufficient. People move and relocate and an address on file with the 
Utah Department of Commerce, while it provides some evidence of where 
an individual lives, is by no means conclusive evidence. For example, an 
address on file with the Utah Department of Commerce may be a 
business address or an address other than the place where an individual 
lives. Someone may have moved but not changed his or her address with 
the Utah Department of Commerce.  
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Heaps is retroactive and invalidates the Default Order and 
Judgment. It is well-settled that “[t]he general rule from time 
immemorial is that the ruling of a court is deemed to state the true nature 
of the law both retrospectively and prospectively.” Malan v. Lewis, 693 
P.2d 661, 676 (Utah 1984). In Monarrez v. Utah Dept. of Transp., 2016 
UT 10, 368 P.3d 846, the Court interpreted a section of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, see Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-403. Mr. 
Monarrez, a party to the action who would be impacted by the Court’s 
interpretation, argued that the decision could apply only prospectively. 
Id. ¶ 27. The Court rejected his argument, as follows: 
The general rule of retroactivity is that “the ruling of a court 
is deemed to state the true nature of the law both 
retrospectively and prospectively.” Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.3d 
661, 676 (Utah 1984). This is a rule of “judicial policy rather 
than judicial power,” as “[c]onstitutional law neither requires 
nor prohibits retroactive application of [a] . . . decision.” Loyal 
Order of Moose, #259 v. City Bd. of Equalization, 657 P.2d 
257, 264 (Utah 1982). Generally, prospectively-only 
application of a decision is a result of a change in the law. 
Id. ¶ 28.   
Relying on Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984), and Monarrez 
v. Utah Dept. of Transp., 2016 UT 10, 368 P.3d 846, the district court held 
that Heaps applies retroactively, and Mr. Price was not a proper 
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defendant in the Labor Commission’s adjudication of the wage claim. R. 
302-303.  
In its brief, the Labor Commission does not dispute the holding in 
Heaps or even that it applies retroactively. See App. Brief at 11-12. The 
Labor Commission skirts around this issue (and the fact that it seeks 
enforcement of an invalid judgment) by arguing that res judicata bars 
consideration of whether Heaps applies retroactively. Id. at 12 (“Because 
res judicata applies, this Court does not need to determine whether 
[Heaps] should be applied retroactively.”). However, as explained below, 
res judicata does not apply here.  
IV. RES JUDICATA DOES NOT APPLY. 
In order for res judicata to bar a cause of action, three requirements 
must be satisfied: 
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their 
privies. Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred must 
have been presented in the first suit or must be one that could 
and should have been raised in the first action. Third, the first 
suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
Macris & Assoc., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, ¶ 20, 16 P.3d 1214. To 
be a final judgment on the merits, “the issue in the first case [must be] 
competently, fully, and fairly litigated.” Swainston v. Intermountain 
Health Care, Inc., 766 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1988).  
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The Labor Commission’s argument that all three elements are met 
here, see App. Brief at 9-12, should be rejected. First, there is no new 
“claim” being asserted. Rather, the Labor Commission seeks to enforce a 
judgment. Similarly, there are not “two cases” at issue here; there is only 
one case at issue. Mr. Price has never asserted a “claim.” He merely 
defends the Labor Commission’s enforcement of an invalid and void 
judgment, which he is statutorily-permitted to do under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63G-4-501(3).   
Next, the Order to Pay and subsequent Judgment were not 
“competently, fully, and fairly litigated.”  Swainston, 766 P.2d at 1061.   
Mr. Price did not receive a notice from the Labor Commission about its 
wage claim and, as a result, he was unaware of the wage claim. Mr. 
Price’s undisputed lack of knowledge of the wage claim renders res 
judicata moot—for the doctrine of res judicata to apply, the plaintiff must 
have been aware of the cause of action at the time the first lawsuit 
commenced. Macris, 2000 UT 93, ¶ 28.  
There was also no fair adjudication on the merits.  The Order to Pay 
was entered after the respondents defaulted by failing to respond to the 
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complaint. Although res judicata may sometimes apply in an 
administrative proceeding, it cannot be given under these circumstances: 
In determining when res judicata applies to administrative 
proceedings, the focus is on the judicial nature of the 
proceedings: 
When an agency conducts a trial-type hearing, makes 
findings, and applies the law, the reasons for treating its 
decision as res judicata are the same as the reasons for 
applying res judicata to a decision of a court that has 
used the same procedure.  But the formality may be 
diminished in any degree, and when it is sufficiently 
diminished, the administrative decision may not be res 
judicata.  The starting point in drawing the line is 
the observation that res judicata applies when 
what the agency does resembles what a trial court 
does. 
Kirk v. Occupational & Professional Licensing, 815 P.2d 242, 243-44 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citing 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 
§ 21:3 (2d ed. 1983)). Res judicata, even if all other obstacles to its 
application were alleviated, cannot apply here in light of Derek Price 
being entirely unaware of the claim against him and the absence of any 
“trial-type hearing.”  
Finally, there is no “final judgment” that can be given preclusive 
effect; the Judgment is void, as explained herein. 
The district court agreed, ruling that the Judgment is “not a 
separate cause of action” and that the Default Order “was not made on 
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the merits but was a default judgment based on his failure to respond to 
the charges.” R. 303-304.  
The case cited by the Labor Commission, Career Service Review Bd. 
v. Utah Dep’t of Corrections, 942 P.2d 933 (Utah 1997), is distinguishable 
because there was a ruling on the merits before the administrative 
agency and the Department of Corrections could have raised all of its 
arguments pertaining to the merits of the decision before the Career 
Service Review Board. Id. at 938-40. Moreover, in Career Service, the 
Court analyzed whether the doctrine of issues preclusion barred the 
issues raised by the Department of Corrections – and not whether claim 
preclusion applied.   
V. THE LABOR COMMISSION ACTED IN BAD FAITH AND 
THE COURT SHOULD AWARD DEREK PRICE HIS 
ATTORNEY FEES.   
Derek Price appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for 
attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825. R. 305. Under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825, the district court can award attorney fees 
if the prevailing party asserts that the opposing party’s claim or defense 
is meritless and brought in bad faith. Childs v. Callahan, 1999 UT App 
359, ¶ 16, 993 P.2d 244. A claim or defense is meritless when it is 
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frivolous, is of little weight or importance having no basis in law or fact, 
or clearly lacks a legal basis for recovery. Bresee v. Barton, 2016 UT App 
220, ¶ 45, 387 P.3d 536. On the other hand, “[b]ad faith . . . is a factual 
determination of a party’s subjective intent and requires the district 
court to find that one or more of the following factors is lacking: (1) an 
honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question; (2) no intent to 
take unconscionable advantage of others; and (3) no intent to, or 
knowledge of the fact that the activities in question will hinder, delay, or 
defraud others.” Bresee, 2016 UT App 220, ¶ 45.  The Labor Commission’s 
actions in this case, and its knowing attempt to enforce an invalid 
Judgment, provide sufficient grounds for a finding of bad faith.   
In addition to litigants’ obligation to pursue claims and defenses in 
good faith and which are “warranted by existing law,” see Rule 11(b)(2), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the legislature has imposed the same 
obligation on the Labor Commission to make a “reasonable inquiry that 
the order [it seeks to enforce] is well grounded in fact and is warranted 
by existing law.” Utah Code Ann. § 34A-5-108(1)(b) (emphasis added). 
The Labor Commission wholly failed to do this.  
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After the Utah Supreme Court decision in Heaps, the Labor 
Commission should have ceased its efforts to collect on the Judgment 
against Mr. Price, knowing that it had taken an erroneous reading of the 
Utah Payment of Wages Act. Instead, and with full knowledge of the 
meaning and import of Heaps, the Labor Commission seeks to enforce a 
Judgment that it knows, or should know, is contrary to Utah law.13 Once 
again, the Labor Commission did not make a “reasonable inquiry” here. 
It has sought to enforce the Judgment (and presumably many  other 
invalid judgments) that is contrary to law.  
As detailed in paragraphs 21-26 above, after the February 17, 2017 
hearing held on Mr. Price’s objection when the court imposed a 30-day of 
the writ so that Mr. Price could try and correct the issues with the Labor 
Commission, Mr. Price made several attempts to try and discuss the 
matter with someone at the Labor Commission. When Mr. Price was 
finally able to get the attention of the Labor Commission’s representative 
he was told that his efforts had “ruined [the representative’s] day”;  that 
the Labor Commission didn’t have time to “waste” to get the issue fixed; 
                                           




and that the time to respond to its wage claim had passed (even though 
it never provided actual notice of this wage claim to Mr. Price). R. 146-
147.   
The Labor Commission had another opportunity to correct its error 
when Mr. Price filed his Motion to Vacate, which outlined why the Labor 
Commission’s Judgment was void and contrary to Utah law.  Instead, in 
an apparent attempt to avoid the district court’s consideration of Mr. 
Price’s Motion to Vacate, the Labor Commission filed a proposed Order 
Re Garnishment. R. 132-135. The filing of this proposed Order invited 
district court error and, in fact, resulted in district court error when the 
court signed the order. R. 283-286.14   
Further, the Labor Commission has never returned the funds it 
wrongfully seized from Mr. Price.  The Labor Commission did all of this 
with full knowledge that it obtained its Judgment against Mr. Price 
based on its misreading of the Utah Payment of Wages Act, in violation 
of Utah law, and without verifying that Mr. Price ever received actual 
                                           
14 The Memorandum Decision and Order superseded and mooted the 
Order Re Garnishment. 
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notice of its underlying wage claim. This conduct establishes bad faith 
and warrants an award of attorney fees to Mr. Price.  
CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
For the same reasons discussed above, and given that the Court 
may affirm the ruling of the district court on any independent grounds, 
Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ¶ 10, 18 P.3d 1129, Mr. Price should be 
awarded his attorney fees under Rule 33 of the Appellate Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should affirm the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction 
under the UAPA. The Labor Commission’s Default Order which it sought 
to enforce in the district court is unenforceable because Mr. Price was not 
afforded due process and the Labor Commission therefore lacked 
jurisdiction to enter the Default Order, rendering the Judgment void  
under Rule 60(b)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Additionally, 
the Labor Commission cannot enforce a judgment against Mr. Price that 
is invalid under the Utah Supreme Court’s decision in Heaps v. Nuriche, 
LLC, 2015 UT 26, 345 P.3d 655. The Court may uphold the district court’s 
ruling on either or both of these grounds. Finally, the Court should 
reverse the district court’s decision denying fees, and award Derek Price 
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his attorney fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825, because the Labor 
Commission acted in bad faith when its knowingly attempted to enforce 
a void and invalid Judgment. 
DATED this 22nd day of June, 2018. 




By: /s/ Jessica P. Wilde    
Mark D. Tolman 
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